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Introduction
"Truly I tell you, whateveryou didnot do for one of the least of these, you
did not do for me."
-

Matthew 25:45

America is fortunate to have a long running and relatively stable
democratic government, due in large part to the robustness of many of its
democratic institutions. Analogically, one can describe democratic
institutions as some of the individual threads comprising the fabric of a free
society. Like the threads making up any fabric, democratic institutions are
not all of equal size and strength, nor do they all serve the same function. In
most fabrics, one thread will not make or break the whole. Some threads
can be strained, worn down, or perhaps even broken, and the fabric will
mostly maintain its form; however, we will still notice when it looks worse
for the wear. Other threads, however, are so fundamental to the structure
that if you remove or break them, the entire cloth will come apart. In a free
society, some threads are actions, like voting or holding peaceful protests.
Others are concrete institutions made up of groups of people, like the courts
or legislatures. Still others are ideals, or cultural commitments - like the
belief in due process, the rule of law, and the equal application of the law to
all people.
Department of Homeland Security v. New York' is a recent
immigration case that exposes the function of three important threads. First,
it invokes the power of federal district judges; they help shape national
policy and protect the substantive and procedural due process rights of
people subject to American law. Second, the case highlights a thread
interwoven within the structure of the courts; our nation's immigration
jurisprudence. Finally, it invokes an ideal: our nation's idea of how we
should treat the disenfranchised and disadvantaged - the "least of these."
Attached to the latter two is a fourth thread, pernicious and profoundly
antidemocratic, yet endemic to America's past and current treatment of
noncitizens: racism.
Several areas of law test our commitment to democratic ideals and
require us to fight against impulses, like racism, that would erode their
foundations. Immigration law is one such area. Like election law,
immigration law exposes a "deep interplay between individual and

'Dep't of Homeland Security, et al. v. New York, et al., 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020).
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collective rights," 2 that can either allow the best aspects of American
democracy to shine through, or enable its worst acts of callous indifference.
In shoring up our nation's democratic institutions and foundations, we are
called upon to use every ethical tool available to protect against, or to
correct, flaws that come to light during a critical evaluation of America's
social fabric. One of those tools is the ability of federal district judges to
impose nationwide judicial injunctions against controversial government
policies, stopping them in their tracks and preventing undue harm to
potential victims while the technicalities of the policy are litigated in court.

-

Allowing federal district judges to impose
nationwide injunctions in immigration cases
honors our commitment to ensuring that
everyone, including noncitizens, has a legal
remedy for harms done to them even if they
cannot afford an attorney;

-

Nationwide injunctions encourage compromise
in creating policy and disincentivize unilateral
and extremist policymaking by the executive
branch, thus providing a stabilizing force in our
democracy; and

-

Nationwide injunctions are newsworthy, thus
generating the attention necessary for public
debate before the enactment of cruel, unpopular
policies. Therefore, they act as a last-ditch moral
safety valve to save America from being its worst
self.

-

This Article argues that within immigration law, the power to
impose nationwide judicial injunctions is an indispensable tool for the
courts to help maintain democratic ideals. This is true for three major
reasons:

In Part I, we discuss the background facts of DHS v. New York,
highlighting Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in the Supreme Court's stay of
the district court's injunction. Part II discusses nationwide injunctions, their
recent uses in immigration cases, and arguments for and against this power.
Part III shows that immigration jurisprudence is a flaw in the foundation of
American democracy. This section outlines how our immigration law came
Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff and Defendant Oriented
Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other ConstitutionalCases, 39 HARv. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 493 (2016).
2
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about and still exhibits traces of structurally antidemocratic principles, like
racism, and a lack of accountability that has enabled recurring abuses. The
use of the term "antidemocratic," rather than "undemocratic," is deliberate.
As the reader will see, the practices at stake are not merely distasteful to a
democratic polity, they actively erode the norms and expectations on which
democratic societies rest. In Part IV, we make the case for keeping the
nationwide injunction power in immigration cases by expanding upon the
points listed above.
I.

The Case

Department ofHomeland Security v. New York is, on its surface, a
case about the "public charge rule." 3 The rule is an artifact of federal
immigration law that has been in force in various forms since the 1880s;
essentially, it allows the federal government to exclude a noncitizen from
the country if, in the opinion of the government, the noncitizen is "likely at
any time to become a public charge." 4 This ground for exclusion is nonwaivable; if a noncitizen is too poor, they cannot gain entry to the United
States.
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) created a new set of requirements that led to
confusion about how the public charge rule would be defined and applied.'
The original policy guidance, created under the Clinton Administration in
1999, interpreted "public charge" to mean a noncitizen who was at a
minimum "primarily dependent on the government for subsistence," based
mostly upon their receipt of a limited set of cash benefits. 6 Non-cash
programs like healthcare benefits or food programs were exempted from the
evaluation. 7
In 2018, the Trump administration opted to expand the definition
and reach of the public charge rule. 8 Under this new interpretation, the
3 See generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Public Charge Provisions of
Immigration Law: A Brief Historical Background, https://www.uscis.gov/history-andgenealogy/our-history/public-charge-provisions-immigration-law-a-brief-historicalbackground (last updated Aug. 14, 2019).
a Id

5 Id.
6 Id.
7Id.
8

U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Proposed Rules: Inadmissibility on Public Charge

Grounds,
83
Fed.
Reg.
51114,
51277
(Oct.
10,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-10-10/pdf/2018-21106.pdf.

2018),
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criteria expanded to include several previously exempt categories, and
further, a noncitizen's receipt of any benefits for more than 12 months in a
36-month period. 9 The practical effects of this expansion made it easier for
the federal government to curtail legal immigration, particularly among
noncitizens without substantial financial resources. The expansion had a
noticeable chilling effect; a significant percentage of noncitizens already in
the United States disenrolled from public benefits for fear of its
consequences. 0
Several entities sued the Trump administration over the expansion,
including the state of New York." On October 11, 2019, the district court
for the Southern District of New York issued an order enjoining the
Department of Homeland Security from implementing their changes to the
public charge rule, pending the consideration and disposition of the
government's appeals on the merits in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 2 Practically speaking, the injunction shielded noncitizens from
the consequences of the policy change until it made its way through the
courts. In 2019, the Trump administration filed an emergency appeal for a
stay of the injunction with the U.S. Supreme Court, and in January 2020, a
5-4 majority of the Court granted that request, enabling the policy to
continue even as it was being litigated. 13

9 Id.

10 See Nicole Narea, Trump's Rule Creating a Wealth Testfor Immigrants is Now in Effect,
PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and2020,
4:44
(Feb.
24,
Vox,
politics/2019/10/11 /20899253/trump-public-charge-rule-immigrants-welfare-benefits;
Hamutal Bernstein et al., With Public Charge Rule Looming, One in Seven Adults in
Immigrant Families Reported Avoiding Public Benefit Programs in 2018, URBAN INST.,
May 21, 2019, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/public-charge-rule-looming-one-sevenSamantha
adults-immigrant-families-reported-avoiding-public-benefit-programs-2018;
Artiga et al., Estimated Impacts of FinalPublic Charge Inadmissibility Rule on Immigrants
andMedicaid Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND., Sept. 18, 2019, https://www.kff.org/reportsection/estimated-impacts-of-final-public-charge-inadmissibility-rule-on-immigrantsand-medicaid-coverage-key-findings/; Leila Miller, Trump Administration's 'Public
Charge' Rule Has Chilling Effect on Benefits for Immigrants' Children, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-02/trump-children-benefitspublic-charge-rule.
" New York v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
12

Id.
13 Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020).
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Justice Gorsuch's Concurrence
While the public charge rule itself presents an interesting legal topic,
of the case that implicates democratic institutions appeared in
part
the
Justice Gorsuch's concurrence - the role of nationwide injunctions at the
district court level. Justice Gorsuch emphatically disapproved of them, and
urged the court to take up the question of whether district judges should
even have such a power. 4 Two of his statements in particular stand out.
First, he wrote that '[t]he real problem...is the increasingly common
practice of trial courts ordering relief that transcends the cases before
them." 1 5 Secondly, he stated that nationwide injunctions go beyond the
scope of the courts' powers:
When a district court orders the government not to enforce a
rule against the plaintiffs in the case before it, the court
redresses the injury that gives rise to its jurisdiction in the
first place. But when a court goes further than that, ordering
the government to take (or not take) some action with respect
to those who are strangers to the suit, it is hard to see how
the court could still be acting in the judicial role of resolving
cases and controversies. Injunctions like these raise serious
questions about the scope of courts' equitable powers under

Article III.16
These statements make valid formalist arguments, but that same
formalism erases the real-world suffering that noncitizens would endure
under a policy change that upended nearly two decades of established law.
By formalist arguments, we mean arguments based in rigid generalizations,
high-sounding platitudes, and hidebound doctrinal boxes" that fail to
grapple with the real-world impact of the position change in question.
Here, Justice Gorsuch laments that nationwide injunctions are
becoming commonly used tools, even as the Supreme Court, with his assent,
granted emergency stays to the Trump administration at uncomfortably
common rates, as his colleague Justice Sotomayor has noted more than

Id. at 600 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
15 Id.
16
14

17

Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, FourIronies of Campus Climate, 101 MINN. L. REV.

1919, 1926 (2017); see also STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND

REGRET FROM U.S. HISTORY (2015) (discussing how disembodied legal reasoning has led
to egregious mistakes at several points in history).
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once. 18 Nowhere in his analysis does Justice Gorsuch consider that the very
policies passed under the Administration might be necessitating this
increase in nationwide injunctions.1 9 Moreover, he offers a doctrinal
concern about nationwide injunctions affecting strangers outside of a given
suit, while neglecting to reckon with the reality that government action, by
its very nature, almost inevitably affects people who are not party to a
particular lawsuit. In immigration, the inadequacy of formalism became
increasingly apparent under a presidential administration that began with,2 0

18 Wolf v. Cook Cty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 683-84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Government has come to treat th[e] exceptional mechanism of stay relief as a new normal.
Claiming one emergency after another, the Government has recently sought stays in an
unprecedented number of cases, demanding immediate attention and consuming limited
Court resources in each. And with each successive application, of course, its cries of
urgency ring increasingly hollow... Perhaps most troublingly, the Court's recent behavior
on stay applications has benefited one litigant over all others.") (internal citation omitted)).
19 Tessa Berenson, Inside the Trump Administration's Fight Against Nationwide
Injunctions, TIME, Nov. 4, 2019, https://time.com/5717541/nationwide-injunctions-trumpadministration/ (noting that in less than four years, the Trump administration's policies
have been blocked by 42 nationwide injunctions, while the Obama administration only
received 20 over the course of eight years, and Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and George W.
Bush received an average of 1.5 per year during each of their tenures).
20 Adam Gabbat, Golden escalator ride: the surreal day Trump kicked off his bid for
president,
GUARDIAN,
June
14,
2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/jun/13/donald-trump-presidential-campaign-speech-eyewitness-memories
(quoting a campaign speech wherein Trump said, in reference to immigrants from Mexico:
"... they're bringing drugs, they're bringing crime, they're rapists.").
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and continued to use, racist anti-immigrant rhetoric to craft policy and score
2
political points 2 ' - often with disastrous results. 2
Alexis de Tocqueville noted America's "singular attachment to the
formalities of law' 2 3 during the genocide of Native Americans in the 1830s,
mockingly stating that it would be "impossible to destroy men with more

-

21 See, e.g., Julissa Arce, Trump's Anti-ImmigrantRhetoric Was Never About Legality

It Was About Our Brown Skin, TIME, Aug. 6, 2019, https://time.com/5645501/trump-antiimmigration-rhetoric-racism!; Philip Rucker, 'How do you stop these people?': Trump's
anti-immigrantrhetoric looms over El Paso massacre, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-do-you-stop-these-people-trumps-anti0
immigrant-rhetoric-looms-over-el-paso-massacre/2 19/08/04/62d0435a-b6ce-11 e9-a0916a96e67d9cce_story.html; John Fritze, Trump used words like 'invasion' and 'killer'to
discuss immigrantsat rallies 500 times: USA TODAYanalysis, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2019,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/08/trump-immigrantsReuters, Survey: Trump 's
rhetoric-criticized-el-paso-dayton-shootings/1936742001/;
immigration rhetoric is negatively impacting Latinos' health, NBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2019,
7:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/survey-trump-s-immigration-rhetoricnegatively-impacting-latinos-health-n1076011; Jonathan Blitzer, How Stephen Miller
ManipulatesDonald Trump to FurtherHis Immigration Obsession, NEW YORKER, Feb.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/02/how-stephen-miller2020,
21,
Stephen
(explaining
manipulates-donald-trump-to-further-his-immigration-obsession
Miller's role in both supporting and creating Trump's immigration policies); Amanda
Holpuch, Stephen Miller: the white nationalistat the heart of Trump's White House,
GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/24/stephenmiller-white-nationalist-trump-immigration-guru; Kim Bellware, Leaked Stephen Miller
emails show Trump's point man on immigration promoted white nationalism, SPLC
reports,
WASH.
POST,
Nov.
. 13,
2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11 / 12/leaked-stephen-miller-emailssuggest-trumps-point-man-immigration-promoted-white-nationalism/.
22 See, e.g., Matt Stieb, Everything We Know About the Inhumane Conditions at Migrant
Detention Camps, N.Y. MAG, Jul. 2, 2019, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/07/theinhumane-conditions-at-migrant-detention-camps.html; Simon Romero et al., Hungry,
Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant Detention Center in Clint, Tex., N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/06/us/migrants-border-patrol2019,
clint.html; Tal Kopan, Trump administrationadmits it lost track ofnearly 1,500 immigrant
children,
CNN
(Sept.
19,
2018,
4:31
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/20 18/09/19/politics/undocumented-immigrant-children-notlocated-detention-released; Robert Moore, Susan Schmidt & Maryam Jameel, Inside the
Cell Where a Sick 16 Year Old Boy Died in Border Patrol Care, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 5,
2019, 1:30 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-the-cell-where-a-sick-16-yearold-boy-died-in-border-patrol-care.
23 Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
EuropeanRacism and Colonialismin the Narrative Traditions of FederalIndian Law, 31

ARiz. L. REv. 237, 240 (1989).
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respect for the laws of humanity." 2 4 Nearly 200 years later, it is
disappointing to see that same attachment to formalism paving the way for
more mistreatment of a marginalized group. This is not to equate genocide
with a change in legal interpretation, far from it, we merely wish to point
so long as we follow the correct set of rules
out that the same thinking
and technicalities, then cruelty is justifiable - is just as profoundly
misguided and unconscionable now as it was then. It is also dangerous to
our democracy. When we allow these behaviors to proceed unchecked, we
risk normalizing them and exposing our society at large to their
consequences. Fortunately, we have a tool at our disposal that stops this
behavior before normalization and allows our society to ask, "is this the
country that we want to be?"
II.

Nationwide Injunctions

"Nationwide injunction" refers to a very specific kind of relief that can be
granted in federal district court. When a plaintiff successfully challenges a
law or regulation as violative of a state or the federal constitution, the court
must decide two things: first, whether an injunction is the correct remedy,
and second, what the appropriate breadth of the injunction would be. 2 5 On
one hand, the court can decide whether the injunction should only grant
relief to the plaintiffs, thus precluding the government defendants from
enforcing the successfully challenged statute against the plaintiffs in the
case, but leaving the government free to enforce the law against other
members of the public. 26 On the other hand, the court can instead choose to
enjoin the government from enforcing the policy against anyone in the state
or the nation.27 When discussing nationwide injunctions, we refer to the
second, defendant-focused option.
A.

Recent Uses of Universal Injunctions in Immigration Cases

Nationwide immigration injunctions have seen increased use in the
past several years, and have had consequences on both sides of the political
spectrum. For example, in 2014, twenty-six states filed suit in federal court
against the Obama administration, challenging a policy known as Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA). 2 8 The policy granted the
241d.
25 Morely, supranote 2, at 489.
26

1d. at 489-90.

27

Id. at 490.

28

Texas v. United States, 86 F.Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
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undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents
(LPRs) temporary relief from removal, as well as work authorization. 29 The
states sought a nationwide preliminary injunction, arguing that DAPA
violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality
Act, and the President's constitutional obligation to faithfully execute
American laws. 30 The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to
prevail on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm if the policy were
allowed to proceed, and issued a nationwide injunction in response. 3 1 The
Fifth Circuit, 3 2 as well as the Supreme Court in a split 4-4 per curiam
opinion, affirmed without setting precedent. 33
Perhaps because of the Trump administration's aggressive antiimmigrant policies, 34 lower courts have handed down several other
nationwide injunctions in immigration cases. 3 5 Perhaps the most highprofile example of these policies is the Trump administration travel ban
created by Executive order 13769,36 also known as the "Muslim Ban." 37

29

Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The PresidentandImmigrationLaw Redux, 125

YALE L.J. 104, 140 (2015).
30 Complaint at 28, Texas v. United States, No. 14-00254 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
31 Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 671-72, 674, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
32 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
33 Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
34 Christine Chan et al., The Trump Effect, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/trumpeffect/immigration (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
3 See, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209,218-19 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing the
recession of DACA); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2.017);
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 291 (7th Cir. 2018); City of Providence v. Barr,
No. 19-1802 (1st Cir. 2020); City of Los Angeles v. Barr, No. 18-55599 (9th Cir. 2019);
City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, No. 18-2648 (3d Cir. 2019); New York et al. v.
United States Dep't of Justice et al., Nos. 19-267(L); 19-275(con) (2d Cir. 2020).
36
Exec.
Order
No.
13769,
82
Fed.
Reg.
8977
(Jan.
27,
2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf.
3' See Avidan Cover, Quieting the Court: Lessons from The Muslim-Ban Case, 23 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUS. (2019); Vahid Niayesh, Trump's travel ban really was a Muslim
ban,
data
suggests,
WASH.
PosT,
Sept.
26,
2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/26/trumps-muslim-ban-really-wasmuslim-ban-thats-what-data-suggest/; Ryan Teague Beckwith, President Trump's Own
Words
Keep
Hurting
His
Travel
Ban,
TIME,
Mar.
16,
2017,
https://time.com/4703614/travel-ban-judges-donald-trump-words/;
Michelle
Mark,
Trump's campaign statements aboutMuslims came underfire duringthe Supreme Court's
travel
ban
arguments,
Bus.
INSIDER,
Apr.
25,
2018,
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-muslim-ban-questioned-in-supreme-courtarguments-2018-4; David Bier, A Dozen Times Trump Equated his Travel Ban with a
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This order banned noncitizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries
from entering the United States. It was immediately challenged in court, and
was nationally enjoined by a federal district court in Washington state; the
injunction was then upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 3 8 The administration
revoked the order and issued a second one, this time temporarily banning
all refugees from entry, as well as nationals from six predominantly Muslim
countries. 39 Again, the policy was challenged in court, and again was
nationally enjoined, preventing it from taking effect. 4 0 This time, the
administration petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of.the injunction,
and the Court responded by slightly narrowing the injunction. 4 1 Eventually,
the second case was dismissed for mootness. 4 2 In September 2017, the
Trump administration issued a third order, placing entry restrictions on
noncitizens from eight foreign nations that it determined had not adequately
shared or managed information about threats coming from their nationals. 43
Ultimately, after further litigation, this third round of revisions resulted in
the Supreme Court upholding the policy in Trump v. Hawaii.44Though the
religious animus behind the ban was well documented, the majority
dismissed this concern 45 using national security justifications in
combination with the plenary power doctrine, discussed below. 46 Instead,
the majority discussed whether the ban fell within the President's broad
legal authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ultimately
holding that it did. 47

Muslim Ban, CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/dozentimes-trump-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban.

Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1511, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017).
39 Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13211-12, 1325 (Mar. 6, 2017).
38

Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-88 (2017).
4' Id. at 2089.
4 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
43 Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the
United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45164
(Sept. 24, 2017).
4

' Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
4s Trump v. Hawaii, 132 HARV. L. REv. 327, 330-31 (2018).
' See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
47 HARV. L. REV., supra note 45.
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The Debate SurroundingNationwide Injunctions

"

Scholars have raised several arguments against nationwide
injunctions in a variety of forums. 4 8 Generally, the arguments against them
are rooted in a process-oriented framework; a leading critic of these
injunctions, Michael Morely, refers to them as "de facto class action[s]. 49
Morely argues that Defendant-Oriented injunctions run contrary to the
policy rationale underlying FederalRule of Civil Procedure23, the law of
judgments, and the courts' limited jurisdiction:
First, the plaintiffs usually lack standing to protect the rights
of third parties, and particularly the rights of the public as a
whole. Second, relatedly, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions
may violate the due process rights of non-parties to the
litigation. By seeking a Defendant-Oriented Injunction,
individual plaintiffs leverage the rights of third parties who
may not even be subject to the court's personal jurisdiction,
without their consent, in order to obtain more sweeping
relief. Third, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions have unfairly
asymmetric preclusive effects. A successful plaintiff can
bind the government defendants regarding people who are
not before the court. If the defendants prevail, in contrast,
that judgment generally does not preclude subsequent
actions, either in the same court or other jurisdictions, by
third parties. Fourth, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions run
contrary to the general rules governing judgments, and
effectively provide class-wide relief despite the plaintiffs'
failure to satisfy FederalRule of CivilProcedure23. Thus,
the policy considerations that underlie both the law of
judgments and Rule 23 weigh strongly against DefendantOriented Injunctions in non-class cases. Finally, by issuing
a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, a court applies its
interpretation of the law to right-holders and claims outside
the scope of its limited territorial jurisdiction, where its
opinions lack precedential effect. 5o

48 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:Reforming the NationalInjunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 418 (2017); Michael T. Morely, DisaggregatingNationwide Injunctions,
71 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2019).

49 Morely, supranote 2, at 522.
50 Id. at 522-23.
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Additionally, one might argue that the power to issue nationwide
injunctions encourages lawyers to forum shop, 5 1 makes the courts
dangerously political,5 2 creates a risk of conflicting injunctions,5 3 and
potentially grants federal district court judges excessive power.5 4
Even so, a few scholars defend federal district judges' power to issue
nationwide injunctions.5 5 At least one Circuit Court has acknowledged their
utility, 56 but scholars offer qualified, rather than broad defenses. They
argue, as does this Article, that nationwide injunctions should be applied
only in specific circumstances or classes of cases, such as bad faith action
by the government. 57 Defenders of nationwide injunctions also argue that
these orders are people-, rather than process-oriented, remedying negative
consequences affecting the victims of poor or extremist policies. Defenders
acknowledge some of the flaws with nationwide injunctions,5 ' but argue
that these are small compared to the benefits. For example, these injunctions
are sometimes necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs, 59 and to
prevent irreparable harm to nonparties that lack easy access to the courts. 60
Further, Amanda Frost, the earliest defender of nationwide injunctions,
argues that "[c]hallenges to policies that cross state lines such as regulations
concerning clean air and water, and some immigration policies [...] require
broad injunctions." 6 1 Additionally, she notes that class certification can be
difficult or impossible to obtain for certain plaintiffs, and in any case, the
government has several strategies available to prevent plaintiffs from
achieving certification. 62 Frost also addresses Justice Gorsuch's concerns
about Article III,63 by noting that though "[t]he text of Article III does not
51 Bray, supra note 48, at 460.
52 Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1065, 1106

(2018).
53 Id.
54

Id. at 1067.
5 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 52; Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying NationwideInjunctions,
98 TEX. L. REv. 67, 106-07 (2019).
See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that although
nationwide injunctions should be rare, they "can be beneficial in terms of efficiency and
certainty in the law, and more importantly, in the avoidance of irreparable harm and in
furtherance of the public interest.").
7 E.g., Tramell, supra note 55, at 104.
58 E.g., Frost, supra note 52, at 1104-15.
59
Id. at 1090-91.
60
Id. at 1094-95.
56

61
62

Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1089.

63 Id. at 1080-90; see also supranote 16 and accompanying text.
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spell out the scope of the judiciary's equitable powers, [...] tradition and
precedent suggest that broad remedial injunctions are constitutionally
permissible, and in some cases essential, as a means of enabling the courts
to check the political branches.""
In addition to the powerful arguments from defenders of nationwide
injunctions, readers should consider a practical analysis that demonstrates
that in immigration cases, the asymmetric claim preclusion argument in
particular is an argument based in abstraction, rather than the realities of
litigation. To reach this conclusion, one needs only look at the massive
power disparities between the litigants seeking immigration-focused
noncitizens - and the American federal
nationwide injunctions
government. The government can indefinitely detain certain classes of
noncitizens,65 and often does so in a way that prevents them from
coordinating with an attorney, 66 compounding the difficulties that
noncitizens generally face in accessing the American legal system. 6 7
Moreover, in immigration proceedings noncitizens do not enjoy a
constitutional right to counsel, they merely have a statutory right to hire
their own attorney. 68 To recognize just how asymmetric immigration cases
are, imagine two boxers rather than two legal parties - the government, a
professional heavyweight, and noncitizens, amateur flyweights. To begin,
the heavyweight has hired the referee and set the rules of the match. Next,
64Id.

65

at 1080.

See infra notes 116-122, 124-133 and accompanying text.

66

Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hemindez, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee Prison

Transfers:Moving LPRs to IsolatedPrisons Violates TheirRight to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY
LA RAZA L.J. 17 (2011) (finding that immigration detainees have a more difficult time
accessing legal aid and representation when they are continually transferred to different
detention centers); see also Yuki Noguchi, UnequalOutcomes: Most ICE DetaineesHeld
in RuralAreas Where DeportationRisks Soar, NPR (Aug. 15, 2019, 7:13 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/15/748764322/unequal-outcomes-most-ice-detainees-heldin-rural-areas-where-deportation-risks; see also Kyle Kim, Immigrants Held in ICE
FacilitiesStruggle to FindLegal Aid Before Being Deported, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2017,
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-access-to-counsel-deportation/.
67 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REv. 1 (2015) (finding that only 37% of all immigrants
and only 14% of detained immigrants secured legal representation from the years 2007 to
2012); see also Samantha Balaban et al., Without A Lawyer, Asylum Seekers Struggle With
Confusing Legal Processes, NPR (Feb. 25, 2018, 2:10 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/25/588646667/without-a-lawyer-asylum-seekers-strugglewith-confusing-legal-processes.
68 Note: The Right to Be Heardfrom Immigration Prisons:Locating a Right of Access to
Counselfor ImmigrationDetainees in the Right of Access to Courts, 132 HARv. L. REv.

726 (2018)..
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the flyweight, who has not been informed of the rules, is blindfolded and
hobbled with a hand tied behind their back. Moreover, the flyweight does
not have a coach or other helper in their corner. Under these circumstances,
Morely's asymmetric claim preclusion critique would argue that, should the
flyweight win under these circumstances, somehow the resulting prize is
unfair. The government is not a small company or other private party; it is
far from helpless. Though the government's resources are not infinite, they
are large enough to minimize concerns about the expense and fairness of
protracted litigation. Furthermore, if one immigration policy is struck down
or stalled, as the Trump administration has shown in cases like the Muslim
Ban, the government simply makes another. 69 Noncitizen plaintiffs do not
have that luxury.
As mentioned, immigration, like environmental policy and voting,
implicates a "deep interplay between individual and collective rights," 70 one
that often cannot be adequately addressed by individual plaintiffs seeking
relief from the law solely for themselves. However, in two respects,
immigration law differs from other areas. First, it was born in, and remains
mired in racism. Second, its current jurisprudence undermines or flouts
every democratic principle that we claim to hold dear.
Consider these points, in turn:
III.

Tips for Implementing Trauma-Informed Practice in the Law
School Classroom.

"Injusticeanywhere is a threattojustice everywhere. We are caught in an
inescapablenetwork of mutuality, tied in a singlegarment of destiny.
Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly."
- Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
To understand how nationwide injunctions can help the courts
strengthen the foundations of American democracy against our immigration
jurisprudence, it is important to recognize just how antidemocratic that
jurisprudence is. Immigration law and policy have enabled America's worst
impulses in the past and continue to do so. Anyone with dreams of enabling
an invasive surveillance state that makes a mockery of the Fourth

69
70

See supranotes 36-47 and accompanying text.
Morely, supranote 2, at 493-94.
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Amendment can do so under the banner of immigration.7 1 Anyone who
wants to act out their worst urges against an outsider can do so to
noncitizens, even killing, with impunity. 7 2 A plethora of atrocities come
readily to mind, with the permissive and racialized nature of immigration
jurisprudence serving as the thread running through many of them. From its
very inception, American immigration jurisprudence has been infected by
racism and inhumane treatment of excluded groups. It is one of the most
antidemocratic and shameful elements in the American legal system. To
correct it, the system needs legal tools that serve as democratic guardrails,
ones that loudly call attention to the injustices taking place in this area of
the law. Nationwide injunctions are effective for accomplishing both
objectives.

71

See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Anil Kalhan, The
Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of InteriorImmigration Enforcement, 41
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. (2008).
72
See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Borderagents beat an undocumented immigrantto death. The
U.S. is paying his family $1
million., WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/28/border-agents-beat(stating
an-undocumented-immigrant-to-death-the-u-s-is-paying-his-family-i-million/
involved
agents
of
the
none
settlement,
in
a
paid
being
is
family
victim's
that though the
faced discipline or lost pay, even though they beat an unarmed man so badly that they broke
his ribs, damaged his spine, and killed him, then tried to seize video evidence from nearby
civilians); Vanessa Romo, Supreme Court Rules Border Agents Who Shoot Foreign
Nationals
Can't
Be
Sued,
NPR
(Feb.
25,
2020,
6:21
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/02/25/8094013 34/supreme-court-rules-border-patrol-agentswho-shoot-foreign-nationals-cant-be-sue.
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America's Last Bastion ofLegally Sanctioned Racism

"In thefirstplace, we should insist that if the immigrantwho comes here
in goodfaith becomes an American and assimilateshimselfto us, he shall
be treated on an exact equality with everyone else, for it is an outrage to
discriminateagainstany such man because of creed, or birthplace,or
origin."
- Theodore Roosevelt, 1907
"In the opinion of the Government of the UnitedStates the coming of
Chinese laborersto this country endangersthe good orderof certain
localities... Hereafterno State court or court of the UnitedStates shall
admit Chineseto citizenship."
- The Chinese Exclusion Act, made permanent by President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1904

Immigration law and policy in America are, at their core, about the
intersection of racism and government power. The proof lies exposed in our
history of hostility directed toward nearly every immigrant group that has
landed on American shores.7 3 Naturally, that attitude has extended to how
the court treats noncitizens. American immigration jurisprudence was born
in the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Melville Fuller. 74 This Court,
which institutionalized racial segregation and hierarchy in Plessy v.
Ferguson,75 also authored Chae Chan Pingv. UnitedStates, 7 6 better known
as The Chinese Exclusion Case, and Fong Yue Ting v. UnitedStates,7 7 two
cornerstones of immigration law. Both cases concerned Chinese laborers
who had resided and worked in America and were facing exclusion or

73 See, e.g., MATTHEw FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN

IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1999); George J. Sanchez, Face the Nation:
Race, Immigration, andthe Rise ofNativism in Late Twentieth Century America, 31 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 1009 (1997 (same)); Ediberto Roman, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HouS. L.
REV. 841 (2008); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy
Scholarship,Law in the Ivory Tower, and the LegalIndifference ofthe Race Critique, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 525 (2000).
7 Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation'sLast Stronghold, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998).
75 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
76 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
77 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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expulsion under the Chinese Exclusion Act. 78 Passed in 1882, and
extending for more than sixty years, the Act was the first piece of legislation
in American history to ban noncitizens from entry based on race. 79 In Chae
Chan Ping, the Court held that even though the Act violated two
international treaties, Congress enjoyed an unenumerated power to regulate
immigration, which could be exercised to exclude aliens of a particular
race. 80 In Fong Yue Ting, the Court held that if Congress branded a race as
undesirable, then lawful residents of that race, even those who had been
living in America for years, could be deported. 8 1 In the same case, the Court
also upheld a rule that explicitly required lawful Chinese residents to have
a white witness to vouch for their presence in America. 82 In both cases, the
Court wrote that it seemed "impossible" for people of Chinese origin to
assimilate into American culture, because of their supposed inborn
defects. 8 3 Neither case has been overturned.
The jurisprudential theory underlying the decisions in these two
cases have come to be known as the "plenary power doctrine," which
provides that the power of Congress over the admission of aliens to this
country is nearly absolute and not subject to judicial review. 84 In many
cases, this doctrine makes racial discrimination in the immigration setting
legal. 85 Stare decisis has kept the plenary power doctrine alive, despite its
origin in the most blatant and outright racism. The Court itself has
acknowledged that the doctrine is at odds with other constitutional
jurisprudence, but essentially shrugs, on the ground that it is too firmly
entrenched to be uprooted. 86
78

Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealedby Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57

Stat. 600.
79 Kat Chow, As Chinese Exclusion Act Turns 135, Experts Pointto ParallelsToday, NPR

(May

5,

2017,

6:06

PM),

https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/05/527091890/the-135-year-bridgebetween-the-chinese-exclusion-act-and-a-proposed-travel-ban; Irene Hsu, The Echoes of

Chinese

Exclusion,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Jun.
https://newrepublic.com/article/ 149437/echoes-chinese-exclusion.
Chin, supranote 74, at 11.
81 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707.
82

28,

2018),

80

Id. at 730.
83 Id. at 717; Chae ChanPing, 130 U.S. at 595.
84 Natsu T. Saito, The PlenaryPowerDoctrine: SubvertingHuman Rights in the Name of
Sovereignty, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 1115, 1119 (2002) (discussing the history of the doctrine
and its place in American law).
85 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731.
86 Chin, supra note 74, at 15-16 (citing Justice Frankfurter in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 530-31 (1954) who wrote "In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due
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A judicial norm, immigration exceptionalism, undergirds and works
in tandem with the plenary power doctrine. 87 Under immigration
exceptionalism, the courts acknowledge that in immigration law, "Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to Citizens,"88
but justify this practice because: 1) it concerns noncitizens; not citizens, 89
and 2) because immigration cases supposedly present "policy questions
entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and
[courts] have no judicial authority to substitute [their] political judgment for
that of the Congress." 90 As a result, "[p]robably no other area of American
law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental
norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role
that animate the rest of our legal system."91
Below, we consider the legal landscape created by these
complementary principles. One of the goals of the courts in a democratic
society is to uphold the rule of law. When examining immigration law we
must be critical; simply "upholding the rule of law" is not a tenable position
when the law permits outright inhumanity. For our democracy to remain
robust and healthy, courts cannot solely be concerned with upholding the
process as a limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war power,
see Hamilton v. Kentucky DistilleriesCo., 251 U.S. 146, 155, much could be said for the
view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of
political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry
and deportation of aliens. [...] But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of
Congress under review, there is not merely 'a page of history,' New York Trust Co.
v. Eisner,256 U.S. 345, 349, but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens
and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of
government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government
must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. The JapaneseImmigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86, 101; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49. But that the formulation of
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded
in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.").
87 See generally David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration
Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 583 (2017) (discussing how the two doctrines work
together to produce an area of almost unbridled discretion); Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a
Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Predictionfor Our Strange But
Unexceptional ConstitutionalImmigrationLaw, 14 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 257 (2000) (same).
88 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
89 Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 87, at 584.
90 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798
(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91 Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 87, at 593 (quoting Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century ofPlenaryPower:Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and
StatutoryInterpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 564-65 (1990)).
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letter of the law; they must uphold a firm commitment to due process and
equal treatment. If a law or policy falls short in these respects, it is
incumbent upon the courts to act as a bulwark for those harmed by it using
any tools at their disposal, including nationwide injunctions.
B.

Immigration Jurisprudence Enables Cruelty and Egregious
Legal Arguments

"We have people coming into the country or trying to come in, we're
stopping a lot ofthem, but we're takingpeople out of the country. You

wouldn't believe how bad these people are. These aren'tpeople, they're
animals."
- President Donald Trump
Under current immigration jurisprudence, America is not only
permitted to be its worst self, it is blessed by the Court to do so. The handsoff approach of the plenary power doctrine, combined with the "anything
goes" reasoning behind immigration exceptionalism, has created legal
cover to a type of dehumanization known as moral exclusion. 9 2 Moral
exclusion is the process of placing undesirable groups "...outside [of] the
[social] boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of
fairness apply." 93 Since morally excluded groups - noncitizens, in this
case - do not count as "one of us," anything done to them under our law is
permissible, no matter how unreasonable or cruel. 94 Consider how
dehumanization enables well-educated attorneys from the American
government to put forward some of the most preposterous arguments that
one could make against a fellow human being, indeed, a child. Consider,
too, whether those arguments strengthen or undermine a nation that
professes to be a healthy democracy.
1.

Cruelty Toward Children

In 2019, a Department of Justice attorney made headlines by arguing
that noncitizen children detained by the government do not need
toothbrushes or soap in order for their conditions to be considered safe and
Philip A. Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, HistoricalDehumanization,
and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 292, 293 (2008)
(discussing the social science roots of dehumanization).
93 Susan Opotow, Moral Exclusion andInjustice:An Introduction,46 J. Soc. IssUES 1-20
(1990) (discussing the roots of dehumanization); see also Bender, supra note 17 (same).
94 Goff et al., supranote 92, at 293
92
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sanitary. 95 This case made the news at the same time that the media were
exposing brutal conditions for children detained at the border under the
Trump administration's mandatory family separation policy.96 Children as
young as seven years old were left to care for toddlers, who, without diapers,
were soiling their clothes. 97 Multiple facilities also faced dangerous
overcrowding, in one instance with nine hundred noncitizens crammed into
a facility designed for one hundred and twenty-five. 9 8 The litigation filed in
response to these conditions arose from the Flores Agreement, a 1997
consent decree regulating the conditions for federal government detention
of minor noncitizens. 99 Though a Trump administration lawyer made the
argument against providing toothbrushes and soap, the conditions at issue
are rooted an Obama administration decision to expand the federal
government's capacity to detain noncitizen families. 100 In 2015, federal
district judge Dolly M. Gee found that the Obama regime had violated the
terms of the Flores agreement by refusing to release accompanied minor
noncitizens from a family detention facility, and detaining the children in
"widespread and deplorable conditions". 10 1 Judge Gee issued a remedial
order to the Department of Homeland Security, which appealed, presaging
a years long battle in her courtroom to enforce the Floresagreement.10 2 Part
of this ongoing battle culminated a 2017 ruling which found that the
government - this time under the Trump administration - had again failed

"

Ken White, Why a Government Lawyer Argued against Giving Immigrant Kids

Toothbrushes,

ATLANTIC,

June

23,

2019,

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/why-sarah-fabian-argued-againstgiving-kids-toothbrushes/592366/.
96 Caitlin Dickerson, 'There is a Stench': Soiled Clothes and No Baths for Migrant
Children
at
a
Texas
Center,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
21,
2019,
also
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html; see
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Lessons from Mexican Folklore: An Essay on U.S.
ImmigrationPolicy, ChildSeparation,and La Llorona, 81 U. PITT. L. REv. 287 (2019).
97 Dickerson, supranote 96.
98

Id.

99 Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 3, 7-18, 20, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544RJK(Px)
(C.D.
Cal.
Jan.
17,
1997),
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/flores_v_meeseagreement.pdf.
I0 Dora Schriro, Weeping in the Playtime of Others: The Obama Administration'sFailed
Reform ofICE Family Detention Practices,5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 452, 458-

65 (2017).
10' Flores v. Johnson, 212 F.Supp. 3d 864, 881 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
102 See generally Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Flores v. Lynch,

828 F. 3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2016).
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to uphold the Floresagreement. 103 Here, the violations consisted of failures
to provide noncitizen children with adequate food, access to clean drinking
water, or access to hygiene products like toothbrushes and soap.' 04
Moreover, the court found that the government was subjecting noncitizen
children to extremely cold temperatures (lowering the temperatures further
when the children complained),10 5 and was depriving them of rest by
forcing them to sleep under bright lights on concrete floors without
blankets. 10 6 The government argued that it did not need to provide children
with soap, towels, showers, dry clothing, or toothbrushes because the Flores
Agreement did not explicitly mention those items. 107 In response, the
district court found that those items were encompassed by the Agreement's
108
language requiring that children be kept in "safe and sanitary conditions."
In 2018, rather than correcting the faulty conditions, the Trump
administration filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit, which alleged that the
district judge had altered the Agreement by mandating soap and
toothbrushes. The appeal was denied.' 09
Children also suffer in other ways under the current immigration
regime. Since noncitizens have no constitutional right to counsel in removal
proceedings, unaccompanied noncitizen children are reduced to
representing themselves in hearings about whether or not they should be
deported." 0 Scholars have argued for an extension of those rights to
noncitizen children,"' but currently courts recognize no such right; in 2018,
a three judge panel on the Ninth Circuit held that neither the Constitution

103 Order Re Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce and Appoint a Special Monitor at 1, Flores v.
Sessions, No. CV 84-4544 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Jun. 27,2017) available at
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/14111359v.pdf.
104
Id. at 7-15.
105

Id. at 16.

106

Id. at 15- 18.

Id. at 13.
1107
08

&

Id
109 Floresv. Barr, 934 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2019).
10 Misrylena Egkolfopoulou, The Thousands of Children Who Go to Immigration Court
Alone,
ATLANTIC,
Aug.
21,
2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/children-immigrationcourt/567490/ (discussing procedural injustice toward immigrant children); Vivian Yee
Miriam Jordan, Migrant Childrenin Search ofJustice:A 2-Year-Old's Day in Immigration
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/migrantchildren-family-separation-court.html (same).
" See, e.g., Benjamin Good, Note: A Child's Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings,
10 STAN. J. C.R.C.L. 109 (2014) (noting the lack of protections for child claimants).
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nor the INA provide noncitizen children with a right to public counsel.1 1 2
In a rehearing en banc in 2019, the Ninth Circuit outright refused to answer
the question. 113

-

The challenges facing pro se litigants are well-documented outside
of the immigration setting, 4 prompting a reasonable observer to ask, what
healthy democracy would put such a burden on a child that does not speak
their language? What healthy democracy would expend resources arguing
that children detained in overcrowded facilities do not need soap or
toothbrushes, rather than simply providing hygiene items? American
immigration law is indicative of a fundamentally unhealthy democracy. It
perpetuates a system that wants the poor, the tired, the huddled masses
so that it can leave them as wretched (but profitable) refuse on a detention
center's concrete floors. 1 5
2.

Indefinite Civil Detention

Physical detention is an inextricable component of American
immigration enforcement; enforcement agents have raided hospitals and
courthouses,1 1 6 and even constructed a fake university to apprehend
noncitizens. 117 Once caught, noncitizens have no way of knowing how long
their confinement will last. In ex rel Mezei, the Supreme Court upheld the

"2 See generally Andrew Leon Hanna, A ConstitutionalRight to Appointed Counselfor
the ChildrenofAmerica's Refugee Crisis,54 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 257 (2019) (detailing
the deficiencies of a system that does not guarantee the right to counsel).
13 C.J.L.G. v. Barr, No. 16-73801 at 4 (9th Cir. 2019) ("[I]t need not address [the]
contention that appointment of counsel for minors in removal proceedings is
constitutionally required.").
114 See generallyJona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Strugglefor Access to Justice:
Meeting the ChallengesofBench andBar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36 (2002).
11s Clyde Haberman, For PrivatePrisons, Detaining Immigrants is Big Business, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/us/prisons-immigrationdetention.html (discussing the deficiencies of the for-profit system).
116 Peter Hall, ICE criticizedfor arrestat Scranton hospital, MORNING CALL (Mar. 16,
2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-pa-ice-immigrantarrest-hospital-scranton-coronavirus-20200316-3itga24pdfau3kjnkm62jcdsai-story.html;
Ryan Devereaux, ICE CourthouseArrests in New York Increased 1,700 Percent Under
Trump, INTERCEPT (Jan. 28, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/28/icecourthouse-arrests-in-new-york-increased-1700-percent-under-trump/.
"?7Sarah Mervosh, ICE Ran a Fake University in Michiganto Catch ImmigrationFraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/us/farmingtonuniversity-arrests-ice.html.
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indefinite detention of a noncitizen on security grounds based on secret
information without judicial or administrative review. 1 8 Mezei was born in
Gibraltar and lived in the United States for approximately 25 years, between
1923 and 1948.119 He left the U.S. to care for his dying mother in Romania,
but was delayed in Hungary for 19 months due to complications with his
documentation 120 . When he tried to return to America, he was permanently
excluded from the country on national security grounds without a hearing
based on secret, undisclosed evidence. 121 Mezei attempted to leave to other
countries, but since the United States had declared him a security risk, no
one else would admit him. 122 Thus, he was effectively stranded on Ellis
Island; he was physically in U.S. territory, but had not been formally
admitted to the country. 12 3 Therefore, Mezei was not in America, legally
speaking.1 24 In immigration, the courts embrace what is referred to as the
entry fiction doctrine - unless a noncitizen is formally admitted, they are
not technically "in the United States." 125 The courts consider this true even
if the noncitizen is forcibly detained by American law enforcement in a
detention facility on U.S. soil. In Mezei, the Court leaned heavily into the
entry fiction doctrine; the justices held that the nearly two-year long
detention of a noncitizen without a hearing was not unlawful because as an
entrant, he had no rights conferred upon him, and no protections under the
Constitution. 126 Additionally, the Court held that neither his physical
presence on Ellis Island nor his previous residence in the United States
changed his status, so he remained excludable. 127
Mezei presents a striking demonstration of the 'plenary power
doctrine and immigration exceptionalism at work. Where else in American
legal doctrine would the court authorize indefinite detention based on secret
evidence, without a hearing? Consider that noncitizens are marched, in
handcuffs by armed guards, into facilities remarkably resembling prisons,
but are considered detained under civil, rather than criminal law, which

118 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1953).
1 9 Id. at 208.
20Id.
121

Id.

122 Id. at 209.
123

Id. at 213.
124 Id.
25 Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in
Immigration Detention, 57 How. L. J. 869, 876 (2014) (discussing the severe drawbacks
of the current system).
126 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212-216.
127

Id.
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means they are deprived of a host of constitutional guarantees.128 Mezei was
superseded by statute, but never overturned. 129 In fact, when similar
circumstances arose decades later in Zadvydas v. Davis, a case about a
noncitizen being detained after he was ordered removed from the country,
the Court simply leaned harder into the entry fiction doctrine. 13 0 There, the
Court distinguished Zadvydas as being territorially present, and thus subject
to some protections and due. process rights that Mezei did not receive. 13 1
Zadvydas was an important case because it showed the Court departing
slightly from the plenary power doctrine, but the relief was short lived. A
later Court, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 132 walked back much of Zadvydas
without expressly overturning it. 1 3 3
These are only some of the best-known examples of the
antidemocratic nature of American immigration law, but there are many
others. For example, immigration law has been used to restrict the First
Amendment rights of noncitizens,' 34 as well as their right to due process. 135
None of these cases has ever been explicitly overturned. Moreover, while
we have already discussed the legal arguments behind Chae Chan Ping1 36
and Trump v. Hawaii,13 7 the through lines between these two cases are well
worth noting; they are over 100 years apart, but both feature a blanket ban
based on nationality, with well documented records of animus toward the
excluded groups, and both imposed exclusion and hardship on lawful
128 Garret Epps, The FragilityofImmigrants' ConstitutionalProtections,ATLANTIC, Nov.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/fragility-of-immigrants7,
2019,
constitutional-protections/601486/.

129 See Perez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-5279, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141768, at 9 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 20, 2018) (describing the human costs of a heartless system).
130

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001).

131 Id. at 693 ("Once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the
Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.").
132 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
133 See generally Miriam Peguero Medrano, Not Yet Gone, and Not Yet Forgotten: The
Reasonableness of Continued Mandatory Detention of Noncitizens Without a Bond
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 597 (2018).
134 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1952) (holding that

Hearing, 108 J.

longtime legal residents of the United States could be deported under an ex postfacto law
because of their former Communist Party membership).
"3 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (holding that
a German woman could be excluded from the country based on secret evidence without a
hearing, because Congress had not required one, and, "whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.").
136 See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
137 See supranotes 36-47 and accompanying text.
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resident noncitizens. 138 The costumes and the characters may have changed,
but the plot remains largely the same.
As shocking as the immigration legal landscape looks, one question
that many Americans might ask is "Why should we care? We are citizens,
not immigrants." The problem with that approach is that the behaviors
enabled under the plenary power doctrine do not stop with noncitizens.
Instead, the antidemocratic behavior enabled by immigration jurisprudence
affects the rights and freedoms of everyone in the country; citizens and
noncitizens alike. For example, the plenary power doctrine and immigration
exceptionalism have granted federal immigration authorities the power to
search citizens without warrants at the border, 139 an authority that has been
invoked to suppress free speech by harassing journalists, lawyers, and
human rights activists.140 The Court also allows border agents to require
citizens to submit to vehicle checkpoints in any area within 100 miles from
the border, and even allows stops based on race. 141 That decision led to
situations 'where border enforcement agents climbed onto private buses
demanding proof of citizenship from Black and Brown passengers, many of
38 Michael Kagan, Is the ChineseExclusion CaseStill GoodLaw? (The PresidentIs Trying
to Find Out), 1 NEv. L. J. FORuM 80 (2017); Garret Epps, The Ghost of Chae Chan Ping,
ATLANTIC, Jan. 20, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/ghosthaunting-immigration/ 51015/.
139 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) ("The Government's
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the
international border. Time and again, [the Supreme Court has] stated that 'searches made
at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by
stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. Congress, since the beginning of
our Government, 'has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches
and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the
collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country."')
(internal citations omitted).
140 Ryan Devereaux, Border Official Admits Targeting Journalists and Human Rights
Advocates with Smuggling Investigations, INTERCEPT (May 17, 2019, 11:33 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/17/border-smuggling-journalists-activists/;
Seth Harp,
I'm a JournalistBut I Didn't Fully Realize the Terrible Power of U.S. Border Officials
Until They Violated My Rights and Privacy, INTERCEPT (June 22, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/06/22/cbp-border-searches-journalists/ (same).
"1' United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) ("Routine searches
of the persons and effects of entrants [into the United States] are not subject to any
requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant. Automotive travelers may
be stopped at fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized suspicion even if
the stop is based largely on ethnicity, and boats on inland waters with ready access to the
sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion whatever.") (internal citations omitted)).
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whom were citizens.1 42 Moreover, the type of indefinite civil detention that
the Court normalized in Mezei and reaffirmed in subsequent cases 4 3 was
used against an American citizen held in custody for over three years
and he is just one of over 1,000 citizens detained by ICE since 2012.145
-44

The abuses by border enforcement authorities under cover of law are
too numerous to list here; racism and cruelty have characterized border
enforcement since its inception, and their influence remains at present.1 46
As this brief review shows, the antidemocratic behavior that we authorize
and normalize against noncitizens will inevitably be unleashed upon
citizens. What we do to the least of these, we do to ourselves.

Adiel Kaplan & Vanessa Swales, BorderPatrolsearcheshave increasedon Greyhound,
other buses far from border, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2019, 1:30 AM),
https://www.nbenews.com/politics/immigration/border-patrol-searches-have-increasedgreyhound-other-buses-far-border-n1012596; Johnny Diaz, Greyhound to Stop Allowing
Border Patrol Agents on Its Buses Without Warrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/22/us/greyhound-border-patrol.html.
143 See supra notes 116-133 and accompanying text.
'"Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, Must Reads: ICE held an American man in custodyfor
1,273 days. He's not the only one who had to prove his citizenship, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2018, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-citizens-ice-20180427-htmlstory.html
(discussing the practice of lengthy immigrant detention).
145 For examples of harsh federal practices see, e.g., Steve Coll, When ICE Tries to Deport
Americans,
Who
Defends
Them?,
NEW
YORKER,
Mar.
21,
2018,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/when-ice-tries-to-deport-americanswho-defends-them; Dustin Dwyer, ICE Tried to Deport This U.S. Citizen and Marine
Veteran, NPR (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/686188335/icetried-to-deport-this-u-s-citizen-and-marine-veteran; Meagan Flynn, US. citizenfreedafter
nearly a month in immigration custody, family says, WASH. POsT, July 24, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/23/francisco-erwin-galicia-ice-cpb-uscitizen-detained-texas/.
146 See ELIZABETH F. COHEN, ILLEGAL (2020) (describing the gratuitous cruelty in federal
immigration practice); Greg Grandin, The BorderPatrolHasBeen a Cult ofBrutalitySince
1924, INTERCEPT (Jan. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM) https://theintercept.com/2019/01/12/borderpatrol-history/; Alex Horton, A Border Patrolchief in a racistFacebookgroup says she
didn't
realize
it
was
racist,
WASH.
POST,
July
25,
2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/25/border-patrol-chief-was-memberracist-facebook-group-says-she-didnt-notice/.
142
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Why We Should Permit (Or Encourage) Nationwide
Injunctions in Immigration Cases

"As citizens, we must prevent wrongdoingbecause the world in which we
all live, wrong-doer, wrongsufferer andspectator, is at stake."
- Hannah Arendt
Nationwide immigration injunctions serve three important
functions. First, they protect and reinforce our ideals about legal
representation, and give those who are wronged a voice in court. As a
democracy, America commits to this principle in several ways: we provide
criminal defendants with legal representation, regardless of their ability to
pay; we allow pro se litigants to be heard at every level of our courts; and
the 1 4 th Amendment guarantees the equal protection of the laws to every
person within American legal jurisdiction, rather than a particular class of
people.
Moreover, nationwide injunctions act as a stabilizing force within
our democracy, discouraging extremist or unilateral policy making on
critical issues. This is particularly relevant in immigration, as the policies
can have drastic consequences for the individuals concerned, up to and
including death.
Finally, nationwide injunctions allow America the opportunity to
reflect, to debate, and publicly decide if we want to be our best or worst
selves. By their nature and rarity, nationwide injunctions are newsworthy,
thus bringing what may have been an obscure legal dispute into the public
forum; this allows citizens to engage with the law, and should they choose,
to place political pressure on policymakers to avoid antidemocratic
government actions.
Consider each of these contentions in further detail.
A.

Nationwide Injunctions Provide Legal Protection to the
Disenfranchised

"The bosom ofAmerica is open to receive not only the Opulent and
respectedStranger, but the oppressedandpersecutedof all Nations and
Religions; whom we shall welcome to a participationofall our rightsand
privileges..."
- George Washington
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As mentioned, immigration jurisprudence undermines our
commitment to due process in many respects. It provides that 'outside of
the border' of the United States, the government is not bound to behave
constitutionally, 14 7 and further that noncitizens cannot invoke constitutional
rights in the same manner that citizens can. 148 But the Constitution is not
merely a set of rights that an individual must invoke, it is a set of structural
restrictions on the government, created to provide a sustainable free society.
Intrinsic in those structural restrictions is a commitment to every person
being entitled to a day in court.
Nationwide injunctions extend that commitment to those normally
outside of the Constitution's protection. Noncitizens, even children, have
no right to public counsel in many proceedings, 149 thus any argument that
assumes that injured noncitizens can simply go to court is unfounded.
Moreover, immigration law is highly sensitive to small administrative rule
changes that require little oversight, but have a ripple effect that harms
thousands. For real-world examples, consider the Trump administration
policy that changed the definition of refugee to exclude thousands of
previously protected people, 5 0 or another Trump administration policy that
altered the detainment policy surrounding asylum seekers, which resulted
in thousands of additional detentions and exacerbated dangerous
overcrowding problems.15 1 Practically speaking, those policy changes
meant that asylum seekers had to, in essence, serve a prison sentence
because they requested asylum. The previous administration's policy
allowed them to gain release on bail while their asylum claim was heard.
The sensitivity to small changes - and the drastic consequences for people
convicted of no crime
are why immigration lawsuits need the ability to
protect more than one person at a time.
147 For a discussion of the outside/inside (and constructive outside) fiction, see Zainab A.
Cheema, A Constitutional Casefor Extending the Due Process Clause to Asylum Seekers:

Revisiting the Entry Fiction After Boumediene, 87 FORDHAM L. REv. 289 (2018).
148 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 128; Ilya Somin, Immigration Law Defies the Constitution,
ATLANTIC,
Oct.
3, 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/usimmigration-laws-unconstitutional-double-standards/599140/.

149 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, The Devil is in the Details: Digging Deeper into
2020 Refugee Resettlement
Changes, NISKANEN CENT., Nov.
18, 2019,
https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-devil-is-in-the-details-digging-deeper-into-2020refugee-resettlement-changes/.
151 Vanessa Romo & Joel Rose, AG Barr Orders Immigration Judges to Stop Releasing
Asylum-Seekers
on
Bail,
NPR
(Apr.
17,
2019,
4:35
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/17/714381003/ag-barr-orders-immigration-judges-to-stopreleasing-asylum-seekers-out-on-bail.
10
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The stakes for noncitizens - detention, deportation, and possibly
death - are as high as they could be. In a democratic society dedicated to
due process, everyone in this position should receive the opportunity to
make a case to avoid those consequences. Yet noncitizens' access to the
legal system hinges on money, understanding a foreign language, and the
cooperation of border enforcement officials; meaning that noncitizens do
not have much legal access at all. Barriers to legal access are compounded
by a byzantine system that seems designed to make sure that noncitizens
cannot be found,'5 2 and by border enforcement's constant harassment of
immigration attorneys that provide pro bono legal services to this group.1 53
Given their unique circumstances and disadvantages, noncitizens need the
facto class actions"
protection of nationwide injunctions -"de
because our country does not provide them with a readily accessible path to
an ordinary class action, or even an individual lawsuit. How can noncitizens
certify as a class when their own lawyers cannot find them?
A nationwide injunction may not stop an individual abuse, but it can
halt systemic changes in policy that harm noncitizens in aggregate numbers.
It can stop the next administrative rule change or executive order that
undermines noncitizens' due process rights or otherwise harms them.
Nationwide injunctions can provide lawyers advocating on behalf of
noncitizens with a fighting chance. Rather than scrambling to wage a war
on two fronts (having to mitigate real world harms caused to their clients by
a policy's implementation, as well as arguing against the policy itself in
court) the attorneys can focus on simply arguing against policy. This is good
for our democracy in two ways: 1) it allows for the peaceful resolution of
seriously harmful policies; and 2) it gives attorneys a chance to push back
against the antidemocratic forces at work in immigration law.
The courts are not the answer to every problem in immigration; in
many cases, they have created or deepened pre-existing problems. But those
mistakes are no excuse to take tools from judges who are trying to uphold
our founding ideals of safeguarding life and liberty. By continuing to allow
152 Dan Canon,

A System Designed to Make People Disappear, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2017),

http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/coverstory/2017/04/icedetainees_ente
(discussing
r_an_unbelievablycruelsystemdesigned_to_make_them_disappear.html
barriers that the immigration system imposes for attorneys and immigration detainees
wishing to find each other).
153 Lauren Carasik, The Government is Targeting Immigration Lawyers, Activists, and
Reporters, BOSTON REV. (Apr. 24, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/global-justice/laurencarasik-government-targeting-immigration-lawyers-activists-journalists.
154 See Morely, supra note 2, at 521-22.
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district judges to issue nationwide injunctions in immigration cases, we can
slow the erosion of democratic norms in this area, and, at least temporarily,
make ourselves live up to them.
B.

Nationwide Injunctions Act as a Political Stabilizer

"Indeed, it has been saidthat democracy is the worstform of Government
exceptfor all those otherforms that have been triedfrom time to time."
- Winston Churchill
Nationwide injunctions are not only a tool to serve the
disenfranchised, they also serve a critical role in stabilizing, and thus
keeping healthy, our democracy. To remain healthy and functional,
democracies require two things from political actors: mutual toleration and
institutional forbearance. 1 5 5 Without them, democracies begin to backslide
toward autocracy or other undesirable forms of government. 156
Mutual toleration is the idea that so long as political rivals play by
constitutional rules, they tacitly agree to accept that each has an equal right
to exist, compete for power, and govern.15 7 Even in disagreement, the
opposition is still legitimate.1 58 Mutual toleration expresses a collective
willingness to agree to disagree. When this norm is weak, a democracy is
difficult to sustain. 159 This virtue is critical to a healthy and functioning
democracy, and requires the safeguard of universal judicial injunctions.
Institutional forbearance is the issue more directly related to the
universal injunctive power. Institutional forbearance describes the behavior
of political actors who avoid actions that, "while respecting the letter of the
law, obviously violate its spirit."' 60 It means that politicians do not use their
institutional prerogatives to the hilt, even if it is technically legal to do so,
because doing so imperils the existing system. 16 1 To conceptualize this, it
helps to think of democracy as a game that we want to keep playing
indefinitely. To ensure that the game continues, players must refrain from
injuring their opponents to the point of incapacitation, or antagonizing them

1"

STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIES DIE

102

(2018) (explaining

how elected leaders can gradually subvert the democratic process to increase their control).

156 Id. at 101-102.
157 Id. at 102.
158

Id.

159

Id. at 104.

1

6 Id. at 106.

161 Id.
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so much that they refuse to play again.' 62 Any adult who plays a game,
such as checkers or chess, with a child, understands this rule. In practice,
this usually means that politicians purposely avoid employing dirty tricks
or hardball tactics in the spirit of fair play. 163 Institutional forbearance is
especially important in presidential democracies - without it, they descend
easily into "deadlock, dysfunction, and constitutional crisis." 164 Acting
without forbearance is a form of "institutional combat aimed at permanently
defeating one's partisan rivals - and not caring whether the democratic
game continues." 1 65
Nationwide injunctions incentivize institutional forbearance and
legislation over extremist or unilateral executive policymaking. Knowing
that a president's policy agenda can be stopped in its tracks for being too
extreme provides a signal to the executive branch, telling it to avoid policies
that would trigger backlash that would put those policies before the courts.
To observe this incentivization in action, we need to look no further than
the procedural history of Trump v. Hawaii.166 As mentioned above, because
of nationwide injunctions, the ban had to be revised three times in order to
pass any sort of muster. 167 The final travel ban was still a rabidly antiimmigrant policy, but it was not as overtly racist as it was to begin with.
The original ban was the sort of extremist policymaking that sparks
backlash,1 68 moving the opposing party away from institutional
forbearance. The anti-immigrant sentiment 169 that empowered the Trump
campaign was very likely itself a result of backlash17 0 against liberal
immigration policies that were also universally enjoined, like the DAPA
162 d. at 107.
163Id
'" Id. at 108-09.

165 Id. at 109.

138 S. Ct. 377.
167 See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
166

168 See, e.g., Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Haley Hinkle, The Abolish ICE Movement
Explained, BRENNAN CENT. (July 30, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/abolish-ice-movement-explained; Elaine Godfrey, What 'Abolish
July
11,
2018,
THE
ATLANTIC,
Actually
Means,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/what-abolish-ice-actuallymeans/564752/ (discussing recent calls to replace the federal deportation system with a
more humane version of border regulation).

ICE'

169 See supranotes 20-22 and accompanying text.

170 Editorial Board, Opinion, A conservative backlash threatens immigration reform,
WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-conservativebacklash-threatens-immigration-reform/2013/04/28/cOa9fb74-aeb5-11 e2-a986eec837b1888bstory.html.
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program. 171 In both cases, nationwide injunctions blunted the policy efforts
of the executive branch; presidential policy was either stopped outright, or
significantly altered from its original guise.
The specter of a nationwide injunction means that in order to preserve
their policy agenda intact and avoid a loss of political capital, a president
would best be served by issuing executive orders with caution and
moderation, and after consulting with the opposite side. Thus, nationwide
injunctions shift policymaking incentives, moving the ideal format away
from unilateral executive directives and toward Congressional legislation,
where political actors must debate and compromise. Debate and
compromise lie at the heart of any democracy, and maintaining them is
critical to keeping the political system sustainable. Shifted incentives do not
guarantee that policymakers will gravitate toward compromise, but like
guardrails, levees, or other mitigative measures, a guarantee is not the point.
The point of mitigation is to make a protected area - in this case, our
democracy - more resilient.
C.

Nationwide Injunctions Provide America with the Opportunity to
Avoid Being Its Worst Self

"As long as my recordstands infederal court, any American citizen can
be held in prison or concentrationcamps without trialor hearing. I would
like to see the government admit they were wrong and do something about
it, so this will never happen again to any American citizen of any race,
creed, or color."
- Fred Korematsu
Nationwide injunctions serve a moral function in addition to their
democratic functions. By their very nature, these injunctions are
newsworthy and can attract the attention necessary to make American
citizens reflect and decide whether we genuinely wish to pursue certain
policies. In that way, they provide a safety valve that steers America away
from being its worst - its most racist, xenophobic, authoritarian, and cruel
self by providing a public opportunity for discussion on otherwise
obscure legal issues. America can be a wonderful place when it wishes to
be, but at too many historical moments America brought shame onto itself
through its laws. 172 The courts are often the last stop before we do so, and

171 See supranotes 28-33 and accompanying text.
172 See Bender, supra note 17.
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nationwide injunctions give the courts one last opportunity to stop us from
going over the edge.
When the courts fail, we end up with stains on our national
character. One such case, Korematsu v. United States, will do so for all
time. 17 3 Korematsu, like many immigration cases, affected citizens and
noncitizens alike, and in modern immigration cases, its themes are still with
us,1 74 as Justice Sonia Sotomayor explained in Trump v. Hawaii:
As here, the Government invoked an ill-defined national
security threat to justify an exclusionary policy of sweeping
proportion... As here, the exclusion order was rooted in
dangerous stereotypes about, inter alia, a particular group's
supposed inability to assimilate and desire to harm the
United States... As here, the Government was unwilling to
reveal its own intelligence agencies' views of the alleged
security concerns to the very citizens it purported to
protect... And as here, there was strong evidence that
impermissible hostility and animus motivated the
Government's policy. 175
Even though the Muslim Ban was upheld, nationwide injunctions,
combined with widespread political protests, stopped its implementation in
its most animus-driven form. American history might have been
permanently altered for the better ifFred Korematsu's case had received the
same rigorous attention. Rather than making us wait decades to admit that
we made the wrong choice, nationwide injunctions give citizens the
opportunity to organize protests and exert political pressure to protect
vulnerable groups. Like all safety valves, this one may not always work, but
it is better to have one and not need it, than to need one and not have it.
Our democracy needs judges to maintain this injunctive power in
order to help us help ourselves. This power is necessary at the district court
level, rather than waiting for years to be enacted at the Circuit or Supreme
Court level, because "justice too long delayed is justice denied."1 76 Unlike
'73 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

174 Philip Bump, How a 1944 decision on Japanese internment affected the Supreme
Court's
travel
ban
decision,
WASH.
POST,
June
26,
2018,
2
018/06/26/how-a-1944-decision-onhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/
japanese-internment-affected-the-supreme-courts-travel-ban-decision/.
175 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2447 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
176 Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in WHY WE
CAN'T WAIT 77 (1964) (articulating a classic defense of nonviolent resistance).
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the government, noncitizens typically lack the resources to go straight to the
Supreme Court with their requests for relief. 177
Might nationwide injunctions backfire and be used by government
to deprive states and locales interested in putting in place experimental or
new measures to assist and welcome new immigrants? This is possible,17 8
but not very likely. As we have seen, ordinarily it is the federal government
that backs harshly anti-immigrant policies and procedures, with private
citizens, attorneys, or occasionally sympathetic cities or states taking action
such as offering sanctuary179 or permission to practice law 10 or attend a
public university. 181The federal government has many other tools to handle
such openly pro-immigrant measures when they arise, including simply
ignoring them. Going to court to ask for a nationwide injunction against a
small, localized practice that does not threaten a national catastrophe would
probably strike most judges as overkill. This is particularly so because such
an injunction would not appear necessary to advance any of the policy goals
of nationwide injunctions mentioned above, including providing citizens
remedies for harm,Is2 providing a stable barrier against governmental over-

'77 See Garret Epps, The Supreme Court is Trump's Enforcer, ATLANTIC, Sept. 15, 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/the-supreme-court-is-trumpsenforcer/598081/.
178 See Miriam Jordan, In the first blow to Biden's immigration agenda, a federaljudge
blocks a 100-day pause on deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/politics/biden-immigration-deportation.html
(noting that a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas had
issued a 14-day nationwide restraining order at the request of the state's attorney
general. The order enjoined a Biden administration directive suspending deportations for
100 days, on the ground that it was not accompanied by a rational reason and contravened
a federal statute requiring that deportations be carried out promptly.)
179 See Immigration 101: What is a Sanctuary City?, AMERICA'S VOICE (Oct. 19, 2019),
https://americasvoice.org/blog/what-is-a-sanctuary-city/.
180 See Dan Cadman, Illegal Aliens PracticingLaw, Ctr. for Immigr. Studies (July 19,
2017), https://cis.org/Cadman/Illegal-Aliens-Practicing-Law (pointing out on behalf of a
conservative center that a number of states permit this practice, but describing it is not a
matter of great concern).
8 See Elizabeth Redden, Report Finds Growth in Undocumented Student Population,

INSIDE

HIGHER

EDUC.,

(Apr.

17,

2020),

https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/04/l17/report-estimates-more-450000undocumented-immigrants-are-enrolled-higher-ed (noting that many colleges
universities are willing to enroll students who are undocumented immigrants).

182 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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reach, 183 and offering citizens an opportunity to discuss unwise and cruel
laws before they go into effect.1 84
Conclusion
"With greatpower, comes greatresponsibility."

- Stan Lee
Some would assert that our judiciary simply calls "balls and
strikes."1 85 That is a pleasant fantasy, but little more than that. Judges are
policymakers with immense power: they can turn the tide of society against
segregation and discrimination,1 86 or they can undermine voting rights and
give political advantages to the partisans of their choice.1 87 They can even
decide presidential elections, thus changing the course of history.1 88 A
tiger's bite does not become any less deadly by claiming that its fangs don't
exist; judicial policymaking does not lose its impact simply because judges
claim that they lack that power.
The judiciary, as policymakers, and as a co-equal branch of
government, is every bit as responsible for strengthening and upholding our
democracy as legislators or executives. One of the tools that they can use is
the issuance of nationwide injunctions, which enable them to protect
vulnerable classes of people from antidemocratic policies--though, to be
sure, they should be used sparingly and responsibly. Eliminating this power
to protect our democracy and to protect vulnerable groups like noncitizens
abdicates the responsibility of the judiciary to act as a shield against
injustice. And the resulting errors that such an abdication enables will stain
us, just as Korematsu does.
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